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Leon E. Trakman* Legal Competence Yesterday
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I. Introduction
Attacks have been lodged against the legal profession for many
years, indeed, since even before Shakespeare commented in Henry
VI, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." However, it
is only more recently, with the growth of mass education and public
awareness and with technological advances, that suspicions of the
incompetence of lawyers has arisen again with a vengeance. Some
would credit this new trend to the condemnation of alleged
incompetence among trial lawyers by Chief Justice Burger of the
American Supreme Court. But to limit the attack on lawyers to this
Chief Justice is to ignore the fact that problems of lawyers' abilities
and performance are the inevitable outgrowth of an increasingly
rights-oriented public, which has responded to the democratic
system by questioning the utility of the lawyering services they
receive in return for their money. The members of an educated
community, conscious of the exchange of values in a free enterprise
system, will ultimately question the mystique that surrounds the
legal profession; they will doubt the lawyers' use of a covetted and
impenetrable language, and they will likely decline to accept advice
without reason, delay without cause, and inefficiency without
excuse.
This paper examines the issue of professional competence,
principally from the perspective of a legal educator functioning
within a law school setting. The following basic questions are
posed. First, what is the meaning of "professional competence" in
the legal profession? Second, who determines the parameters of
professional competence in law? Third, what forms of legal
education are needed in order to provide society with lawyers who
best satisfy such standards of professional competence?
II. The Meaning of Professional Incompetence
One might well presuppose that incompetence encompasses only an
inability to perform. An incompetent lawyer would then be inept; he
*Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
832 The Dalhousie Law Journal
or she would be unsuited to the practice of law, disinterested in his
or her responsibilities, and incapable of providing reasonable
services for value. In reality, incompetence does encompass such
situations, but it also includes a great deal more. To be incompetent,
a lawyer might fall below a requisite standard of ability on but a
single occasion, with respect to a single legal issue, and in relation
to only a single case. Incompetence in law is not the preserve of
only the hopelessly substandard practitioner and the obviously
dishonest abuser of the public trust. Legal incompetence can be, and
is, demonstrated by a multitude of lawyers who are often very good
and are the most skilled in their powers of reasoning and the most
highly regarded by their fellows. Such incompetence occurs when a
usually able lawyer attempts to service a wide and often diverse
clientele. It occurs when he or she is tired and overworked, upset or
irritable, hasty or careless. Legal incompetence is not peculiar to the
"other" lawyer; it is common to all of us in the profession. The
parameters of legal incompetence are, therefore, determined not in
the abstract, but against the background of actual practice.
Incompetence is measured in terms of actual standards of
performance, minimum levels of ability, and identifiable perfor-
mance goals. Any concept of professionalism demands some
requisite standard of ethics, some basic level of honesty and
decency. Competence in law is a measure both of the capacity to
perform and of performance itself. The lawyer must be able to carry
out lawyering functions with a requisite degree of knowledge and
skill, and he or she must also be willing to perform such functions
honestly, completely, and on time. In addition, lawyering requires
psycho-sociological abilities, for the law is a human science that
addresses public and private concerns alike. A competent lawyer is
one who is able not only to recognize social needs, but also to
respond to them through recourse to legal institutions, doctrines of
law, and specified legal procedures.'
1. The Code of Professional Conduct of the Canadian Bar Association provides as
follows: "Rule (a) The lawyer owes a duty to his client to be competent to perform
the legal services which the lawyer undertakes on his behalf (b) The lawyer should
serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should
provide a quality of legal service at least equal to that which lawyers generally
would expect of a lawyer in a like situation." Code of Professional Conduct,
C.B.A., ch. 2, pp. 4-6, 1974. The Code of Professional Responsibility, of the
American Bar Association, Canon 6, stipulates that: "A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Competently." The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, drafted by the
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards of the American Bar
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Undoubtedly, lawyering demands both the diligent and the
ethical execution of legal responsibilities. The lawyer needs to
know how to reason in and about the law, and how to fulfill his or
her tasks with diligence and deliberateness, efficiency and
conscientiousness. An inability or an unwillingness to fulfill any of
these legal roles gives rise to the pertinent query: was that conduct
competent and was that performance professional?
2
The meaning of the term competence should not be over-
extended. Competence does not equal omnicompetence. No lawyer
can be expected to carry out with perfection all legal functions that
might arise, and no lawyer can be expected to know all of the law,
considering the complexity of legal rules and the diversity of factual
issues. Legal practitioners simply cannot canvass every conceivable
legal avenue. Moreover, lawyers differ from one another in
sophistication, counselling skills, drafting ability, and capacity to
litigate. In short, they are not alike in all matters of competence.
3
Association, defines competence as the "specific legal knowledge, skill,
efficiency, thoroughness, and preparation employed in acceptable practice by
lawyers undertaking similar matters" (Rule I. 1, Discussion Draft, Chicago, Jan.
30, 1980). See, in general, Professional Competence and The Law (L. Trakman,
ed., 1981).
2. It should be noted that competence in law is usually defined more in relation to
-performance" than "capacity". See A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibi-
lity, E.C. 6-1 to 6-6. However, capacity still remains an intrinsic preliminary
criterion in determining questions of performance. For example, The Conference
on the Quality of Professional Services, C.B.A., postulates that "1. The
Conference accepts the definition of "'competence" as the state of having the
ability or qualities which are requisite or adequate for performing legal services
undertaken, and it accepts the definition of' incompetence" as the state of lacking
the ability or qualities which are requisite or adequate for performing legal
services... (italics added)." In terms of this definition, the lawyer's ability is
envisaged as a prerequisite to his performance. In fact, this need not be so, and
often is not so. The lawyer's absence of performance may well arise as a result of
overwork or overcommitment, even though he or she is otherwise most able.
3. The attributes of competence, as defined in both The Code of Professional
Conduct of the C.B. A. and The Code of Professional Responsibility of the A.B.A.,
are distinctly broad in character. Consider, for example, the commentary on
competence in the code of the C.B.A.: "1. Competence ...has to do with the
sufficiency of the lawyer's qualifications to deal with the matter in question and
includes knowledge and skill and the ability to use these effectively in the interests
of the client. 2. As a member of the legal profession, the lawyer holds himself out
as knowledgeable, skilled and capable in the practice of law. . . .3. It follows that
a lawyer should not undertake a matter unless he honestly believes he is competent
to handle it . . .(Ch. 2, pp. 4-5, 1974)." These comments raise questions of both
nature and degree. How much "knowledge and skill" should the lawyer possess in
practicing law? What are the parameters of his or her capacity to provide legal
services? How do we decide when a lawyer is entitled or justified "to believe [that]
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Yet it is precisely the popular myth that lawyers are all-able,
all-knowing, and all-seeing with respect to the law - the notion of
nemo juris ignoantiam excusat - which produces the greatest threat
to the legal profession, for such a belief induces in society an
unrealistic expectation that satisfaction should and can always be
provided by the legal profession. Such a misconception produces a
deep-seated mistrust of lawyers, especially when that which the
public expects is not forthcoming. Whatever professional compe-
tence might mean, it should not mean perfection in legal know-how
and professional ability. Unjustified social expectations of lawyers
give rise to unjustified criticisms of lawyers. A legal profession that
perpetuates a myth of infallibility defies growth. We should move in
the other direction.
4
III. Who is Competent?
Understanding the meaning of competence in law presupposes an
understanding of the meaning of law itself. The competent lawyer is
expected to "know" the function of the law and to comprehend its
operative mechanisms. Yet lawyers are not uniform in their
capacities to perform. They have differing abilities in oral advocacy
and in negotiating contracts, drafting wills, and conciliating
conflicts. Just as they differ as persons, so do they differ in their
ability to assimilate information and articulate arguments. How,
then, do we distinguish the competent from the incompetent? Where
he is competent to handle" a legal matter? The Code of Professional Conduct of the
C.B.A. does not answer these questions. See, in general, Professional Competence
and The Law, supra, note 1.
4. For critical commentary hereon, see Brunis, Incompetence of Defense Counsel
in Criminal Cases (1974), 16 Criminal L.Q.; Burger and Barnett, Rx for
Continuing Education: Lawyer, Examine Thyself (1973), 59 A.B.A. Journal 877;
Rosenthal, Evaluating The Competence of Lawyers (1976), 11 Law and Soc. 257;
Allen, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Legal Education (1976), 62
A.B.A.J. 447; Fromson, Let's be Realistic about Specialization (1977), 63
A.B.A.J. 74; Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility
(1974), 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702: Carrington, On the Pursuit of Competence (1976),
Trial 35, 12; Reiter, Discipline as a Means of Assuring Continuing Competence in
The Profession (1978), paper 11, Professional Organizations Committee, Ontario;
Kelso and Kelso, The Future of Legal Education for Practical Skills: Can The
Innovation Survive? (1977), Brigham Young Un. L. Rev. 1016; Frankel, The
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View (1975), 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103; Carrington,
The University Law School and Legal Services (1978), 53 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 402;
Swan, Continuing Education and Continuing Competence, Selected Checklist of
Materials on Specialization (1979), 34 Record 441.
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is the dividing line between professional and unprofessional
behaviour?
A single standard of competence, applied to all absolutely, is
undoubtedly most convenient, for it is certain in nature and
predictable in operation. But fixed standards produce rigid results.
Once fixed, they fail to allow for the differing abilities of lawyers.
Surely the lawyer who is a specialist should not be judged according
to exactly the same standard as the non-specialist. Surely a single
standard of competence does not promote justice if it regulates both
experienced and inexperienced lawyers without differentiation. 5 By
contrast, relative standards of competence offer the advantage of
flexibility. Yet relativism raises the crucial question of to whom and
to what degree the standards are relative. All lawyers could be
required to perform at some minimum level of competence, but
what might this minimum level be? Alternatively, standards of
competence could be set relative to the qualifications of the
practitioner, reflecting his or her training in law, experience in
practice, and complexity of function. Yet such relativism introduces
not only a lack of clarity as to what constitutes competence, but also
a discriminating standard in favour of some practitioners at the
expense of others. Most importantly, if relative standards of
competence are to apply, the following question arises: who should
make such decisions and in accordance with what criteria? 6
Surely, the relative character of standards of professional
competence evolves out of a weighing of interests. These include
private and public concerns, social and economic demands, and
political and cultural forces. Thus, the performance of lawyers
5. See Kelso, The Duty to Deliver Competent Counsel, Panel Discussion, (1976),
30 Un. Miami L. Rev., 847; Puffer, Specialization-A New Legal Direction: Good
for Old Lawyers-Bad for New Ones (1976), 3 Barrister 1:57; Harrison, What Now
for Lawyers (1975), New Law J. 276; Wolkin, More on a Better Way to Keep
Lawyers Competent (1975), 61 A.B.A.J. 1064; Yegge, Tomorrow: The Future
Role of the Lawyers (1969), 29 Louisiana L. Rev. 640; Anderson, "Education,
Competence and Quality of Service, Appendix B2", in The Legal Profession and
the Quality of Legal Services (Ontario, 1978) pp. 85-115; "Report of the Special
Committee on Competence, Manitoba, Appendix D3", in The Legal Profession
and the Quality of Legal Services (Ontario, 1978) pp. 350-5.
6. On the relative dimensions of professional competence in law, see, in
particular, Allen, New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Education (1976);
28 Mercer L. Rev. 447; Clare, Incompetence and the Responsibility of Courts and
Law Schools (1976), 50 St. Johns L. Rev. 463 (1976); Esau, Specialization and
The Legal Profession (1979), 9 Man. L.J. 255; Cramton, The Hired Gun or the
Social Engineer (1977), 4 Learning and L. 18, n.3. See further, supra, note 5.
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should be judged, in part, in light of the background and experience
of individual practitioners and, in part, in accordance with
community standards reflecting social need, financial exigency, and
political expectations. 7 Ultimately, absolute standards of compe-
tence must be weighed against relative standards. To impose a rigid
and unchanging standard of competence upon lawyers, to the
exclusion of all other criteria, would be to reduce professional
standards to their lowest common denominator. To require from
lawyers only a minimum standard of competence would also be to
shelter - indeed, to cloister - the legal profession from public
responsibility, notwithstanding social demands for more exacting
standards of professionalism. Again, the solution must lie in a
balance being struck between social needs and professional
capabilities.
IV. Who Determines Competence?
A key problem in determining the parameters of professional
competence lies in identifying the interdependence that exists, or
should exist, between the personal, social, and legal expectations of
lawyers. Society at large, the law society, the bar, and the
individual lawyer all influence the character of legal competence.
Yet which force should predominate? Who is the primary
determinant of professional competence and what are the
parameters of such decision-making power?
Lawyers are functionaries charged with public responsibilities.
Their service to the public should accord with the existing social
need for such service, and their competence should advance with
the advances of society. 8 Thus, competence in law presupposes
knowledge of man in society and of the control that law imposes
upon man in society. Each increase in socio-cultural complexity
produces to a legal reaction to such complexity. Each development
of mankind should be counterbalanced by an equivalent develop-
ment in the ordering of mankind. Variations in social attitudes
should be displayed in the legal regulation of such attitudes, and
developments in technology should be reflected in the legal control
7. See, supra, note 5.
8. See further, Duncan, Public Access to Law in the 1980s (1980), 44 Sask. L.
Rev.; Fraser, Recent Developments in Legal Education: The Victoria Experience
(1979), 13 U.B.C. Law Rev. 224; Carrington, The University Law School and
Legal Services, supra, note 5.
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exerted over such technology. Just as lawyers need to monitor
cultural and economic development, so they also need to evaluate
the lawyering process in terms of such developments. 9
Community attitudes cannot be ignored in evaluating what
constitutes a "worthy" legal fee, a useful piece of legal advice, or
the most justifiable conclusion to a legal confrontation. Yet
community assessments of legal competence have inherent
limitations. Perceived legal abilities, as evaluated by lay members
of society, may well differ from real legal abilities, and apparent
legal sophistication may disguise very real legal deficiencies. A
client who feels that he or she is receiving value may assume the
existence of competence which may not exist in fact. So long as
such public misconceptions prevail, community determinations of
competence in the practice of law will be inadequate as a measure of
ability and performance in law. 10
Can the lawyer be directed to regulate his or her own performance
through education and restraint, caution and precaution? Certainly,
competence in law is maintained in part by voluntary means.
Lawyers attend continuing legal education conferences, junior
members of the bar consult with senior colleagues, and law libraries
facilitate learning in the law. But self-motivation has its limits; it
takes time to learn, it costs money to attend conferences, and the
general practice of law makes it difficult to follow complex
developments in multiple legal areas. To rely entirely upon personal
motivation in the search for competence in law is to disregard
human frailty. Growth in legal knowledge and skill presupposes that
individual lawyers aspire towards such growth. Such may be the
case, but it need not necessarily be so.
What can be said of the legal profession as a regulator of
performance? Should and can the profession, as a whole, create and
implement standards of professional competence, and if so, how
should such standards be determined and how are they to be
9. Detailed discussions hereon are contained in Arthurs and Verge, The Future of
Legal Services (1973), 51 Can. Bar Rev. 15; S. Colvin, D. Stater, L. Taman, J.
Yale and F. Zemans, The Market for Legal Services: Paraprofessionals and
Specialists (1978); B.F. Christenson, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means
(1970); B.A. Curran and F.O. Spalding, The Legal Needs of the Public (1974),
A.B.A. - A.B.F. p. 63; Thomason, What the Public Thinks of Lawyers (1974), 46
N.Y.S.B.J. 151; R.L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public
Interest Law (1976), 28 Stan. L. Rev. 207; Bauer, On Producing Intellectual
Giants and Moral Midgets (1975), Learning and L. 12, no. 2.
10. See in general, supra, n. 9.
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enforced? Undoubtedly, the regulation of the legal profession must
emanate, to a large degree, from lawyers themselves, acting as a
collectivity. Lawyers are better able than the lay public to evaluate
the competence of other lawyers, for they are better informed about
the nature and significance of law and are less readily misled in the
assessment of legal competence." Yet how do we limit the risk of
the role that self-interest might play in a legal profession charged
with the responsibility to evaluate itself, and how do we ensure that
the competence of lawyers advances as technology, knowledge, and
innovation advance? The answer must lie, to some degree, in the
institutionalization of professional competence within an ordered
framework which would reflect a predetermined structure and
content. Complex questions of methodology must be resolved,
including: how is professional competence to be institutionalized in
legal form, and, most importantly, how is this to be achieved? The
answers, it is suggested, lie primarily in the hands of the bar and the
law school. Competence training is their shared duty; incompetence
is their joint responsibility.
V. Competence and the Bar
Standards of professional competence can be created at various
levels. They are often devised in law school programs, through
courses on legal ethics and professional responsibility, and in
seminars devoted to legal education and jurisprudence. Yet can we
teach aspirant lawyers to be moral? Can we show them, in a
classroom setting and in the absence of prior professional
11. The regulation of the legal profession by the profession itself has been the
subject of numerous studies to date. See, inter alia, Reiter, Discipline as a Means
of Assuring Competence in the Profession, supra, note 4; Anonymous,
Professional Discipline of Solicitors in England (1979), 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1732;
Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere (1977), 10
Creighton L. Rev. 613; Miller, Justice Report on Complaints against Lawyers
(1970), 33 Mod. L. Rev. 542; Steele and Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and
Professional Regulations (1976), 3 A.B.F. Research J. 917; Wolkin, On
Improving the Quality of Lawyering (1976), 50 St. John's L. Rev. 523; Parker,
Periodic Recertification of Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Programs for
Maintaining Professional Competence (1974), Utah L. Rev. 463; Brickman, "The
Education and Licensing of Lawyers: Current Proposals to Improve the
Competence of Lawyers", in Conference on Education and Licensing of Lawyers
(Florida, 1976); Redlich, "Lawyer Education and Certification: Flawed Premises
and Uncertain Results", in Conference on Education and Licensing of Lawyers,
supra, in note; Gilbreath, Maintaining Competence Among Lawyers: How Far
Have We Come (1979), 24 Catholic Law 162.
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experience and training, what is responsible and competent
behaviour? The answer is surely a qualified "no": we cannot teach
aspirant lawyers to be honest and trustworthy, but we can inform
them of the moral and legal consequences that flow from dishonest
and untrustworthy conduct. We cannot show students how to be
professional in their legal practices before they even have such
practices, but we can instruct them in the conduct of simulated or
clinical legal practice.
The bar has a vital role in the professional and competent training
of its membership. Various reasons give rise to this responsibility.
Of necessity, training in legal competence is an ongoing function; it
does not cease on graduation from law school, nor does it end upon
the award of a law degree. There is a need for the boundaries of
education to be extended as new legal procedures, novel problems
of law, and more complex issues of fact arise in the societal sphere.
No lawyer can hope to graduate from law school with an ability to
weather all legal storms, for his competence reflects his experience,
and so long as his pre-existing experience is primarly academic or
simulated in nature, his competence in practice is likely to be
limited. We cannot set unrealistic training goals for law schools, yet
how is such an education in law to be provided? Do we mandate
programs in continuing legal education and compel all lawyers to
participate in such exercises?' 2 Or should continuing education
programs be voluntary, dependent upon the willingness of lawyers
to undertake training in specialist or generalist, and practical or
academic, areas of law? Surely the answer is both. Voluntary and
mandatory education in law are complementary means of attaining
professional competence in law; they are not mutually exclusive.
How, too, can we train lawyers effectively after they have
12. Mandatory legal education has been given particular stress over the course of
the last decade. See, in particular, Byron, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
in Minnesota (1975), 54 Mich. State Bar J. 361; Byron, Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education in Minnesota: The First Year (1975), 50 St. John's L. Rev. 512;
Clark, Report of the Task Force on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education in Ohio
(1976), 3 Ohio Northern Un. L. Rev. 915; Hardy, Continuing Legal Education in
Kentucky: A Mandatory Plan (1976), 40 Kentucky Bench and Bar 10; Leet and
Loeb, Continuing Legal Education: Should it be Compulsory? (1975), 27 J. Legal
Ed. 110; O'Donnell, Compulsory Continuing Legal Education: Periodic
Recertification of Lawyers (1976), 62 Women Law J. 20; Sheran and Harman,
Minnesota Plan: Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for Lawyers and Judges
as a Condition for the Maintaining of Professional Licencing (1976), 44 Fordham
L. Rev. 1081.
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completed law school, but before they are admitted to the bar? For
some decades, lawyers in British Commonwealth jurisdictions have
been exposed to articling programs and bar admission courses. Each
form of. legal training has distinctive characteristics. Articling
periods provide the law school graduate, who at that stage is a
trainee lawyer, with an exposure to the practice of law while under
the supervision of qualified members of the bar. 13 Periods of
articling are followed by bar admission courses, which give aspirant
lawyers an opportunity to study law in organized programs of
instruction which are created and conducted by the bar itself. 14 Both
of these post-law school activities have particular virtues and pitfalls
in relation to professional competence; each will be examined
below.
The articling system has a number of distinctive attributes.
Properly supervised, the trainee lawyer is introduced to the practical
day-to-day activities of a law office. Court-rooms, clients, and
administrative tribunals also represent areas of learning. While
articling, the student lawyer is exposed to the law as it operates, not
merely as it appears in a case-book, in a simulated problem, or in a
lecture. Yet legal articling, as a system, does not necessarily ensure
competence; it is only a possible means towards the realization of
competence. Articling programs give rise to their own peculiar
pitfalls; indeed, they grow increasingly suspect with the passing of
time. Attention must be paid to the costs of the articling system, the
problems of supervising articling students in diverse legal areas, and
the need to train such students and yet operate a viable legal
practice. Articling programs also need to be structured. One may
well ask how long the articling period should be - six months, a
year, or perhaps two years - and who should be responsible for
such programs - the bar, parts of the bar, the legal profession as a
whole, or some other body? Articling programs also require
coordination. Program organizers must decide upon the role of law
13. On a critical evaluation of the articling system as a post-law school experience,
see, infra, note 15.
14. On the bar examination and subsequent assessment of legal competence, see
Brickman, "The Education and Licensing of Lawyers: Current Proposals to
Improve the Competence of Lawyers" (1976), C.L.E.P.R., Florida, cited, supra,
note 11; Redlich, "Lawyer Education and Certification: Flawed Premises and
Uncertain Results" (1976), C.L.E.P.R., Florida, cited, supra, note 11; Covington,
"The Multistate Bar Examination" (1976), C.L.E.P.R., Florida; Pincus, Clinical
Training in the Law School - A Challenge and a Primer for the Bar and Bar
Admission Authorities (1976), 50 St. John's Law J. 479.
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firms who participate in such programs: should these employers be
required to supervise and examine articling students according to
prescribed standards in order to ensure a minimum quality and
breadth of training? Moreover, should they be required to report on
the quality of student performance after or during such articling
periods?
To date, few of the above-mentioned controls have been
comprehensively introduced into the articling system within
commonwealth jurisdictions. Supervision of articling students is
usually carried out on an ad hoc basis, and it varies in quality and
intensity from law firm to law firm and from supervisor to
supervisor. Seldom are articling systems monitored by the bar,
seldom are supervising lawyers required to provide specific forms
of training, and seldom are reporting responsibilities imposed on
either the employers or the student lawyers. Regretfully, the utility
of such articling programs depends more upon chance than design.
The indictment of the articling program is indeed severe. 15
The value of the articling period will inevitably hinge upon the
manner in which the system is implemented and the method by
which it operates in practice. Minimum criteria for the functioning
of articling programs should include: the development of a
supervised and coordinated activity, the implementation of
15. The articling system as it relates to professional competence has been
extensively criticized in recent years. The criticism has assumed two dissimilar
directions. First, there is the view that the articling system requires increased
supervision, direction, and control. Second, and somewhat more vehement, is the
suggestion that the articling system should be abolished in toto. As to the first
alternative, The Special Committee on Competence of The Law Society of
Manitoba, recommended in 1977 that "7. [c]lose liaison be maintained between
the administration of the bar admission course and the principals [that is, the
supervising lawyers] to ensure that students are obtaining the best possible practical
experience. 8. Lawyers in whose offices students articled should be encouraged to
take an active role in teaching their students. 9. The bar admission course be used
to reinforce a student's office training where his experience in his office does not
meet the minimum criteria for practical legal training (s.C. 7-9, Articling)."
Regarding the second criticism, namely, abandonment of articles, Professor
Anderson writes that "even the one year of post-graduate apprenticeship now
commonly required is of a length and cost disproportionate to its benefit, that
experiences in articling vary widely in range and quality, that a growing number of
articling positions are seriously deficient in the breadth and order of experience and
the quality of instruction and supervision they provide, and that in some instances
the students see mediocre or even poor practices that in turn they may adopt and
perpetuate." See D. T. Anderson, "Abolishing Service under Articles of
Clerkship", in Conference on the Quality of Legal Services (1978), Part 2, VI 2.
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standards of performance to be complied with by supervising
lawyers, and the monitoring of articling activities through reports on
the articling students, to be submitted by the supervising lawyers to
the coordinators of the articling programs. In the absence of such
controls, the operation of the articling system is likely to remain as
questionable in nature as its current procedures, and as doubtful in
its effect as its present record.
The other post-law school activity of interest here, bar admission
courses, can be useful in training lawyers for professional practice.
Introduced after the completion of an articling period, the courses
provide a useful link between theoretical and practical legal
education. The bar admission student who possesses both a law
school background and articling experience is then exposed to
practical legal subjects, both procedural and substantive, which are
taught primarily by members of the bar. The bar course, which is
usually followed by a examination, also constitutes that final
introduction of the student to the legal world before he actually
enters the ranks of the qualified profession. 16 But to what extent are
bar admission courses necessary to the development of professional
competence, and if deficiencies in such courses are revealed, how
are they to be remedied? The answers are varied. Bar admission
courses should encompass not simply the learning of substantive
rules of law, but also an exposure to legal analysis and to the
practical problems that are encountered in the performance of
lawyering functions. In addition, the aspirant lawyer needs to
appreciate those circumstances in which questions of professional
competence are most likely to arise in practice and, most
importantly, the ways in which lawyers can either avoid the
occurrence of such incompetence or remedy its effect through
countervailing action. Thus, the bar admission course represents
that last stage at which the still unlicenced lawyer can be forewarned
of the pitfalls that most frequently arise in professional life.
The existence of bar admission courses still gives rise to specific
questions of structure and content: who should administer such
programs, what courses should be included, and, most signific-
antly, what should their orientation be? Ideally, the bar itself should
be the primary administrator of these courses, since it is best
equipped to identify the needs of legal practioners and the
qualifications and practical skills they are required to have. Yet
16. See,supra, note 14.
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difficult decisions must still be made. Bar admission courses,
especially those in areas of substantive law, should not be totally
theoretical in content; legal theory is most usefully taught within
academic confines, by law professors, and over a more extensive,
three-year period. Nevertheless, bar admission courses do need a
theoretical superstructure that can integrate disparate legal concepts
and doctrines, and rules of law, into a homogeneous mold.
Compromise is inevitable; a balance must be struck between formal
instruction in and knowledge about the law. We cannot expect less
from aspirant lawyers, nor should we.
Competence in law still cannot materialize out of a static mold.
The teaching of lawyers to be professionally competent within
practice-oriented programs should be systematized in accordance
with social need, and the learning of the law should be adaptable in
nature if the legal profession is to respect, and thereby be respected
by, society. Such is ultimately a necessary goal of both articling and
bar admission systems if public interests are to be revered.
VI. Competence and the Law School
The development of professional competence in law is also very
closely related to the law school environment, in which legal
training is initially provided. Law schools can be exclusively
academic centres for theoretical training in law, or they can also
provide practice-oriented training in legal technique. This
dichotomy has plagued legal educators for decades. 17 Law schools
nas indeed serve as clinical centres in which legal skills are acquired
in simulated and real-world settings. But, if this is so, there is still a
need for an intellectual environment in which an education in legal
theory is offered. Theoretical knowledge is the backdrop against
which practical skills are subsequently displayed. Moreover, it may
well be asked whether law schools have the facilities to serve as
practical centres, given the role of the articling system and the bar
admission courses in the acquisition of legal skills.
17. Cf. notes 4 and 7, supra. In particular, see A Dialogue: Theoretical versus
Practical Legal Education (1977), 2 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1; Cramton & Jensen, The
State of Trial Advocacy and Legal Education: Three New Studies (1979), 30 J.
Leg. Ed. 253; Carrington, The University Law School and Legal Services, supra,
n. 4; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, supra, n. 4; Kelso, The
Duty to Deliver Competent Counsel, supra, n. 5; Clare, Incompetence and the
Responsibility of Courts and Law Schools, supra, note 6; Allen, Prospects of
University Law Training (1977), 63 A.B.A.J. 346; Bridge, Academic Lawyer:
Mere Working Mason or Architect? (1975), 91 L.Q.R. 488.
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Even if the function of the law school is defined in academic
terms, the structure of educational programs must still be
established. There is a need for educational direction. There is a
demand for planned action in determining the nature of law courses.
Law school syllabi should be rationalized in terms of the community
of interests which lawyers are pledged to serve. What is required are
methods of instruction which foster those legal skills that legal
practitioners need in order to fulfill their professional
responsibilities. 18 It is true that no single form of instruction in law
can satisfy all community wants, and no one method of learning can
respond to the heterogeneous backgrounds and interests of each and
every aspirant lawyer. Yet, no matter how relative the educational
needs in law are, they still warrant a coordinated base, a cohesive
foundation, and a sound and well-reasoned superstructure.
At present, there is evidence that an unstructured educational
system has evolved. An over-abundance of unsystematized courses
is being offered in North American law schools. A study of law
school catalogues demonstrates that the number of law courses has
multiplied significantly over the last two decades. In addition,
courses sometimes lack design, they frequently overlap with one
another in content, and it is often difficult to differentiate between
their theoretical orientations. Frequently, their creation can only be
rationalized in terms of the personal and research interests of
particular teachers. 19 Within this educational process, emphasis
may well be placed on the "academic freedom" of both professor
and student. The teacher decides what to include in his or her
syllabus and how to teach the subject. The second and third year law
student, in turn, is largely free to choose his or her own courses and
to determine what to study and what to avoid studying. This
apparent freedom of choice is based on a fiction. It presupposes that
18. See in general, supra, note 17.
19. On these complex questions, see Boyer and Cramton, American Legal
Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform (1975), 59 Cornell L. Rev. 221;
Keeton, Tell Me, Show Me, Involve Me -Establishing a Framework for Learning
(1976), 2 Learning and L. 16; Vernon, The Expanding Law School Curriculum
Committee: The Move by Courts and the Organized Bar to Control Legal
Education (1976), 1 J. Leg. Prof. 7; Auerbach, As Lawyers Multiply, Civilization
Decays (1977), Learning and L. 10, no. 2; Benthall-Nietzel, Empirical
Investigation of the Relationship Between Lawyering Skills and Legal Education
(1974-75), 63 Ky. L. J. 373; Rohan, Legal Education and Training for the
Profession: An Overview (1976), 50 St. Johns L. Rev. 494; Trakman, Canadian
Law Schools: In Search of Excellence (1980), 6 Dal. L.J.
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a student is able to make an intelligent course selection even before
he or she is able to appreciate the significance of that choice. It is
founded upon the further misconception that a law teacher who
orients courses around his or her own idiosyncracies is necessarily
exercising academic freedom.
20
Specific deficiencies in the educational system are also evident in
the very structure of our law school programs. First, objections can
be made to the classification systems that are currently used to
determine the nature of law school syllabi. For instance, are
contracts and torts truly serviceable subject areas or should they be
reclassified? An alternative classification, linking both contracts
and torts together in a single subject, might well be more realistic.
Another choice might be to reclassify the "rights" arising in
contract and tort law and to distinguish these from the "remedies"
associated with contracts and torts. This would encourage an
intermeshing of related principles of law and, at the same time,
would distinguish between legal rights and remedies. Nevertheless,
the key issue is not whether these proposed classifications are
suitable; rather, the issue is whether or not current course
classifications are acceptable in the light of a dynamic and
ever-growing range of competing alternatives.
Second, advocacy skills are often overstressed in law schools at
the expense of other methods of teaching and learning. 21 Law
schools concentrate upon the appellate process: the students study
appellate cases and the moot in simulated appellate courtrooms. But
what attention is given to the pre-appellate activities of lawyers?
Surely, skill in these areas as well is within the needs of the
competent practitioner. Surely the aspirant lawyer should not be
20. See Stevens, Democracy and The Legal Profession (1976), 3 Learning and L.
12, no. 3; Carrington and Conley, Alienation of Law Students (1977), 75 Mich. L.
Rev. 887; Weinstein, Economic Scarcity as a Threat to Academic Freedom (1977),
3 Learning and L. 29, no. 4; Botein, Reflections on The New Humanism in Law
(1976), 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1295; Frankel, Humanist Law: The Need for Change in
Legal Education (1976), Utah L. Rev. 39; Katz and Denbeaux, Trust, Cynicism
and Machiavellianism Among First Year Law Students (1976), 53 J. Urb. L. 397;
Mindes, Forcing an Identity Crisis on Law Students (1975), 2 Learning and L. 44.,
no. 3; Trakman, Law Student Teachers: An Untapped Resource (1979), 30 J. Leg.
Ed.
21. But cf. Seymour, Current Trends in Legal Education and The Legal
Profession -An Advocate's View (1976), 50 St. John's L. Rev. 434; C.L.E.P.R.,
Law School Teaching Clinic: Plans and Pictures (N.Y., 1977); Gould, Law
Schools Can Teach Courtroom Skills (1976), N.Y.L.J. 1; Oleck, Adversary
Method of Law Teaching, Summarized (1975), 27 J. Leg. Ed. 86.
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trained almost exclusively in an appellate role when there are a
multitude of non-appellate functions which the competent lawyer
may be expected to perform.
Lawyers require far more than an ability to argue cases. They
should know how to negotiate agreements, what strategies to
employ in reaching consensus, and what instruments to use in
resolving disputes in the absence of such consensus. They need to
understand how to draft and interpret documents, and how to avoid
ambiguities in the construction of such documents. Teaching
appellate advocacy skills should not displace these very necessary
components of the educational process. However, the greatest need
of all is for an integrated approach towards professional
competence. There is a call for cohesion in teaching and learning,
for structure in law school programs, and for direction in the
orientation of legal studies. Courses in law cannot evolve simply by
osmosis, by mere chance, or by a teacher's whim. Methods of
instruction cannot develop along isolated lines, ill-attuned to the
dynamics of law practice and deficient as a means of advancing
professional standards in law. Courses in law need a rationalized
foundation. In practice, law courses are often poorly structured,
they overlap with one another in substance and in content, and they
frequently lack a systematized base. One solution is to teach fewer
courses in our law schools, thereby reducing the overlap between
them and eradicating those subjects which are deemed to be least
significant or most repetitive. This systematization can be achieved
in various ways: through the analysis of course content on a
piecemeal basis, by means of course clustering, and by streaming
courses in accordance with their educational relevance.
The piecemeal examination of law courses requires a close study
of individual courses, their nature and content, and, in particular,
their relevance vis-4-vis other courses and the educational design of
the law school as a whole. Relevant questions include: what issues
or topics does each course address? Are such topics or issues dealt
with in other courses? How important are such issues and topics in
and of themselves, and how important are they in relation to the
educational design of the overall curriculum? For instance, a
so-called advanced course in property law may be deemed to add
little to the educational framework of the school if that course
displaces or otherwise overlaps with other advanced and introduc-
tory courses in property.
Course clustering is the next stage in the process of curricular
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examination. At this stage of reform, courses are grouped within
various categories, such as substantive law categories (which would
include family law), special skills categories (which would include
negotiating and drafting clusters), or practice-oriented categories
(which would include clinical law). The goal of this procedure is to
determine the relevance of each course grouping, or cluster, in
relation to the curriculum at large, and thereafter, the value of the
members of each category. Thus, in a commercial law cluster, the
absence of a commercial drafting component might lead either to
the creation of a commercial drafting course or to the integration of
drafting exercises within the existing cluster of commercial or,
alternatively, drafting courses. So too, the absence, within existing
law clusters, of students' experience in the interpretation of
documents may give rise to a new cluster of courses devoted to
interpretation itself, or an interpretation component may be added to
existing clusters. Clustering, therefore, has this advantage: it creates
a hierarchy of needs within law school programs. In so doing, the
present haphazard and piecemeal evolution of law courses would be
replaced by a process of logical assessment.
Nevertheless, the clustering and refinement of syllabi does
introduce its own distinctive pitfalls and raises the following
questions: how is clustering to take place? What clusters are to be
chosen? How are law courses to be integrated within such clusters?
Even more problematic is the question of what educational goals
should underlie this clustering methodology.
The development of course clusters does require guidelines.
Clusters can be devised on numerous bases - for example, within
substantive or adjectival courses, as theoretical or practical subjects,
or with an emphasis on descriptive or analytical content - and with
diverse social-economic and political ends in mind. Thus, a cluster
can have a multiple design: to train aspirant lawyers in a particular
legal area, such as contract law; to provide information about
contract law; to teach the rules and principles of contract law; to
train students in the techniques of negotiating, drafting, and
interpreting contracts; and to teach aspirant lawyers how to analyze
the law of contracts and how to apply that law within theoretical and
practical contexts. The cluster itself may consist of several or many
courses in contract law, depending upon the nature, qualifications,
and interests of the faculty and students, the number of existing
courses within the cluster, the needs of competing clusters, and the
overriding educational design of the law school. For instance,
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courses on drafting or interpreting contracts may be omitted from
the contracts cluster, due to the existence of alternative clusters
which are devoted specifically to drafting or interpreting. The
nature and content of each cluster, therefore, varies in accordance
with the form of other clusters. No one cluster is immutable and no
one cluster subsists for all time; rather, all are interdependant and all
require periodic review.
Legal education presupposes a rationalized basis. The educa-
tional design mentioned above is one alternative; there are others.
Yet course cohesion is necessary if educational viability is to be
achieved. To deplete this cohesion in the interest of alleged
academic freedom is to overstress the freedom of the teacher at the
expense of the collective design. To do so is to institutionalize
choices of individuals and to disregard our communal respon-
sibilities as educational facilities.
VII. Competence Today and Tomorrow
The path towards professionally competent education lies, to some
extent, in appreciating the multiple roles of lawyers today. The
stereotypical all-knowing, all-seeing, and all-hearing legal prac-
titioner, who can deal with all legal matters, no matter how complex
or diverse their nature, is a myth. To perpetuate the myth is to
ignore the realities of modem practice. It is to forget that lawyers
are engaged in diplomatic and civil functions, in commerce and
industry, and in public and private legal practice. To train lawyers
to fulfill multiple functions without making distinctions as to skill
and interest is to disregard the diversity of legal talent and the
demand for a versatile legal profession. To unify our educational
system within a confining mold is to stress superficiality at the
expense of an in-depth training in law.
22
Inevitably, the development of professional competence in law
22. In general, see Legal Education in a Changing World (N.Y.: Int'l. Law
Center, 1975); A. Reed, Present Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada
(N.Y., 1976); Symposium: Law in the Future: What are the Choices? (1976), 51
Calif. St. B.J. 276; J.S. Auerbach, UnequalJustice: Lawyers and Social Change in
America (N.Y., 1976); D. L. Horowitz, The Jurocracy: Government Lawyers,
Agency Programs, and Judicial Decisions (Mass., 1977); C. Meyers, Education of
Present and Future Lawyers in Law and The American Future (1976), 179 N.J.;
Whitmore, Are the Needs of the Community for Legal Services being met by our
Universities? (1975), 49 Aust. L.J. 315; Galinson, Interviewing, Negotiating and
Counseling (1975), 27 J. Leg. Ed. 352.
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will be determined by those who teach, practice, and adjudicate
within the profession. How proficiently and ethically individuals
conduct their legal affairs will depend on individual and collective
moral concerns, social values, and self-respect itself. We cannot
train the flagrantly unethical to be ethical, nor can we mold the
inherently immoral into the indisputably moral. Certain evils that
exist in society and in man cannot be resolved through legal
education, professional example, or even the threat of punishment.
Yet individual malfeasance is a collective responsibility. It is a duty
which is borne by the educational and professional institutions that
train individuals, scrutinize their conduct, and regulate their
conformity with or deviation from acceptable behaviour. The duty
to provide society with competent lawyers rests, to a noticeable
degree, with law schools. They serve as chronological and
institutional fathers; the professional is the product of their diligence
and their involvement in the furtherance of legal knowledge.
However, the duty to train is an ongoing and mutual function; it
rests with the bar and the bench, and is never-ending.
The training of lawyers cannot evolve without reflection upon the
evolution of society itself. Methods of legal education should
embody, not gainsay, social interests. Educational programs should
maximize, not minimize, community concern. To fulfill educa-
tional goals, a synthesis is needed to link social behaviour to a legal
understanding of that behaviour. A scientific approach is required
that fosters not only legal advance, but the educational embodiment
of that advance.
VIII. Reflections
The search for professional competence in legal education is a
journey down a long and winding road, filled with intersections and
overpasses, detours and distractions. Yet, it is a route that should be
followed if our educational system is to respond to public demands
for a competent legal profession. To make any progress along the
pathway is a formidable task, but the risk of inertia is damning. No
branch of the legal profession is excluded from this journey; our
responsibility to promote professional competence is interdepen-
dent. Together, we, as a profession, travel along the same pathway.
Together we attain our communal ends, or fail.
